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Male Prostitution & Equal Protection: An Enforcement Dilemma 
THAYNE D. STODDARD* 
I was in my first weeks of law school, desperately outlining, briefing, and 
constantly studying, when I was first exposed to prostitution. I had just returned 
home from an afternoon studying and was changing into gym clothes when I 
heard a knock at my door. I opened the door to an attractive, young African-
American woman who I had seen walking in my neighborhood. After 
exchanging greetings, she asked me if I wanted to “hang out.” I thought the 
question a benign one, and while we had talked once or twice, I was a little 
confused as to how she knew where I lived, and why she had singled me out. At 
my confused expression, she explained, “You know, make some heat.” Being 
rather slow, I still must have looked confused, as her tone became exasperated, 
and she blurted out, “I’m trickin’!” Embarrassed at my denseness, slightly 
offended, a little scared, and blushing furiously, I told her that I was sorry and I 
wasn’t really interested, but I’d be happy to grab a meal with her sometime. Yes, 
in my anxious state, I asked a prostitute to join me for dinner. As she walked out 
the door, she turned, and with a broken look, asked if there was no way that I 
could help her. I didn’t know what to say.  
The experience brought into sharp reality the facts that I had heard about 
prostitution in America. Many have studied the problems surrounding female 
prostitution and have found just how troubling the conditions are for these 
women. While it is difficult to find reliable data regarding prostitution, some 
reports show that, of street prostitutes, 65 to 75% are victims of long-term incest.1 
Of all prostitutes, 75 to 90% were sexually abused during childhood,2 and 85% of 
prostitutes working in the United States are addicted to crack, heroin, 
prescription drugs, or alcohol.3 Working the street is a bleak prospect for women, 
according to Dr. Joyce I. Wallace, the founder of From Our Streets with Dignity 
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http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/97/10/23/PROSTITUTION_5.html. 
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(an organization which offers free services to women who are often defined as 
prostitutes in New York City). “Half the time, they’re on the street because they 
had a drug problem and got thrown out of whatever homes they came from, . . . 
[b]ut half are on the street because it’s less violent than home. They turn to drugs 
to make life tolerable.”4 Academic work on the plight of female prostitutes has 
been extensive.5 
But women are not the sole purveyors of sexual services in America or the 
world. Men throughout history have also offered up their bodies for money, with 
some academics positing that ever since women have solicited, so have men.6 
Ancient Greek acceptance of the practice is well documented, and it was even 
licensed and taxed in Augustinian Rome.7 Despite this prevalence, even if male 
prostitution has occurred on a less grandiose scale to its female counterpart, 
“social inquiry has been largely limited to women servicing men.”8 
My purpose in this note is threefold: first, to examine the history and 
present-day social status of male sex workers and the academic understanding 
thereof; second, to analyze whether historical legislation targeting female 
prostitution would, in fact, have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth  Amendment of the United States Constitution as it stands today had 
the statutes remained in their gendered forms; and finally, to assess whether 
today’s current prostitution law enforcement policies, though couched in 
generally gender neutral language, in fact violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because of law enforcement’s insistence on almost the exclusive targeting of 
women for the crime of prostitution. While arguments can be made both for and 
against Equal Protection violation, the existence of the dispute itself brings to 
light a number of worthwhile questions about the nature of prostitution at large 
and the way we as a society choose to prosecute and deter individuals from 
engaging in it. At the same time, the nature of male prostitution as a near-
exclusively same-sex exchange affects the comparison itself, as female-male 
encounters carry their own set of issues.9 
Ultimately, I conclude that in order to best protect the interests of both men 
and women, these anti-prostitution statutes must be enforced against both sexes. 
By only prosecuting women, we are stating that differences exist where in fact 
they may not. Stating these differences harms women by forcing them to view 
themselves as weak and in need of protection, while simultaneously pushing 
male sex workers to believe they should be able to help themselves in a 
potentially dangerous situation. While selective enforcement of these laws might 
be constitutional, we would do well to reexamine the idea of “real” differences in 
the hopes of lessening discrimination, as well as gender stereotyping, against 
 
 4. Christopher S. Wren, Life Gets Harder on the Already Mean Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at 
B3 (quoting Dr. Joyce I. Wallace, founder of Frost’d  a non-profit organization that helps prostitutes). 
 5.  See, e.g., R. BARRI FLOWERS, THE PROSTITUTION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS (1998). 
 6.  DONALD J. WEST, MALE PROSTITUTION ix (1993). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See J. Marlowe, It’s Different for Boys, in WHORES AND OTHER FEMINISTS 141 (Jill Nagle ed., 
1997) (considering the heteronormative boundaries confronted in female-male exchanges). 
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both men and women. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MALE PROSTITUTION10 
The existence of male sex work dates back to antiquity. The relationship 
between the male sex worker and his society has varied across time and cultures. 
In Ancient Athens, an adult male prostitute was treated as a second class citizen 
and had no political rights, while his clients remained full fledged citizens.11 
Adult prostitution existed simultaneously with a more youthful counterpart, and 
Rome had many boys’ brothels where men could seek sexual services from other 
men and boys.12 The street-walking youth sex workers also had their place, 
“lifting their tunics to show off their genitals and entice potential clients.”13 
There was a similar delineation between prostitutes and their clients in the 
Arab world as well. The receiving (penetrated) sex worker was thought of as the 
disordered and dishonorable member of the pairing, while the active 
(penetrating) client was able to maintain his status as virile and masculine by 
avoiding playing the part of the penetrated, woman-like figure.14 
This seemed to also be true in the European world prior to the arrival of 
Christianity. As Christianity established itself, along with its strict condemnation 
of homosexual acts, male prostitution continued to exist, although discretely, 
operating within the still functioning bathhouses of the Middle Ages.15 Further, 
historian Vern L. Bullough has documented the existence of male prostitution in 
the Americas prior to the arrival of Western explorers.16 Colonization did not 
stop this spread; as Western peoples and ideals moved across America, male 
brothels sprung up in metropolises all the way to the Pacific.17 
 
 10.  For purposes of this note, I will be using the term “prostitution” as defined by The New 
Oxford American Dictionary as “The practice or occupation of engaging in sexual activity with 
someone for payment.” THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1369 (ELIZABETH J. JEWELL &  
FRANK R. ABATE eds., 2001) (JW, Rule 15). This definition includes street solicitation for sexual acts, 
stripping, as well as escort services and erotic massage.  Id. Though a prostitute (I will use the term 
sex worker going forward, as the term “prostitute” carries its own discursive burden) may participate 
in only some and not all activities, the full range of sexual services offered by sex workers which fall 
under the traditional legislative definition of prostitution requires a broad reading of the term. 
Additionally, I have chosen to limit myself to male-male exchanges, rather than address female-
female exchanges as well, due to the fact that the literature in same sex interactions is also segregated 
this way. The issues surrounding male-male interactions may indeed be similar to those of female-
female interactions, but in order to focus the scope of my paper, I have chosen not to address the 
similarities and differences, instead limiting myself to male same sex exchanges. 
 11. MICHEL DORAIS, RENT BOYS: THE WORLD OF MALE SEX WORKERS 13 (Peter Feldstein trans., 
2005). 
 12.  See id. at 14 (discussing the existence of brothels in Rome where young men “offered their 
charms with a modicum of discretion.”). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.   Jayesh Needham, After the Arab Spring: A New Opportunity for LGBT Human Rights 
Advocacy?, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 101, 110 (2013). 
 15.  See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 14 (discussing the condemnation of homosexuals in the church). 
 16.  See VERN L. BULLOUGH, SEXUAL VARIANCE IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 45 (1976) (detailing the 
existence of prostitution in South and Central America prior to Westernization). 
 17.  See ROBIN LLOYD, FOR MONEY OR LOVE: BOY PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA 74-75 (1976) (“San 
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Prior to the 20th century and the formulation of the modern 
heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy,18 same-sex sexual encounters were largely 
considered acceptable for the penetrating or active partner (if not in society at 
large, then at least within the confines of the active partner’s own self-
perception). Conversely, the penetrated, receiving, or passive partner (and often 
sex worker) was frequently regarded as effeminate and distasteful.19 
In fact, the discourse surrounding male prostitution itself was largely 
intertwined with discussions of homosexuality at large, in that it was not until 
discussions about homosexuality as an identity entered the discourse that male 
prostitution was considered equivalent to female prostitution. While evidence 
exists that male prostitution in London frequently occurred as early as the 18th 
century, “such behavior was often not recognised as prostitution. No distinction 
emerged during this period to distinguish same-sex desire from commercial 
sexual activity involving males, both being conflated and assumed to be 
indistinguishable.”20 In other words, male prostitution as an equivalent to female 
prostitution did not exist because gay desire did not exist in the public’s mind. 
The situation, prior to this hetero/homosexual conceptual turn in the early 20th 
century, is described by LGBT historian George Chauncey as one wherein “the 
predominant form of male prostitution seems to have involved fairies selling sex 
to men who, despite the declaration of desire made by their willingness to pay 
for the encounters, identified themselves as normal.”21 These clients did not yet 
need to confront any questioning of their “sexuality” as such, because in 
maintaining their role as a penetrator, they were allowed to retain their 
masculinity, heterosexuality, and thus avoid the pitfalls created in occupying the 
passive role of the prostitute. The sex worker himself did not need to confront his 
own sexuality, as it was conceptually tied up in his profession; as the passive 
partner, he was defined simply as a male prostitute without the need for a 
further homosexual identity and the ensuing examination of real desire. These 
distinctions in how a society, and the individual participant himself, think about 
male prostitution are important for the later discussion of whether there exist 
real differences in male prostitution vis-à-vis female prostitution.22 
Whether we frame male-male exchanges as homosexual activity or as 
simply the exploitation of impoverished, young, heterosexual men may help 
determine if a legitimate and avoidable social harm exists in male-male 
exchanges. It ultimately becomes a question of whether the presence of desire 
affects the way social harm is framed. If we deem these men homosexual, we 
then inevitably open the door to the sex worker actually enjoying the exchange. 
If so, does this enjoyment remove the risk of the social harms, including 
degradation, to a straight man engaging in male-male sexual conduct as a means 
of financial necessity? Ultimately, in asking if these harms are removed by the 
 
Francisco got off to an early start in the boy business, also in the late 1800’s, during the Gold Rush.”). 
 18.  See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 15. 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  John Scott, A Prostitute’s Progress: Male Prostitution in Scientific Discourse, 13 SOC. SEMIOTICS 
179, 181 (2003). 
 21.  DORAIS, supra note 11, at 15 (quoting GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK (1994)). 
 22.  See discussion infra Part V. 
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presence of desire, we are confronting whether we can treat male-male sexual 
commodification differently from female-male exchanges, which we seem to 
believe has more obvious social harms. But, taking desire into account in this 
way exposes the inconsistency in how we weigh desire in a female-male 
exchange, where no one asks if the woman is enjoying herself as a means to 
either mitigate or heighten the level of harm to both the sex worker and society. 
It seems that desire should play no part in assessing these harms, and yet from a 
practical standpoint, society has largely tied up the question of the existence of 
homosexual desire with whether or not a harm exists in male-male sexual 
exchanges. 
The image of the poor, often exploited, young male as the face of male 
prostitution came into prominence in the academic and popular mindset in the 
middle of the 20th century.23 Scott describes the way in which male prostitutes 
were depicted: 
Male prostitutes came to be depicted as young, innocent victims of older, 
predatory perverts: 
During this period it was understood to be the duty of the law and agencies of 
enforcement to protect ‘ignorant’ young males from the ‘unnatural lusts’ of older 
men . . . Increasingly, young males involved in prostitution were portrayed as 
weak and lacking in judgment. . .they were not automatically classified as 
‘homosexuals.’24 
Dorais identifies the destitute nature of young male runaways as the driving 
force for many young men engaging in same-sex prostitution in the Americas.25 
These young men may have viewed engaging in same-sex sexual acts as a last 
resort, or perhaps as simply a chance at relatively easy money.26 Because the 
hetero/homosexual identity dichotomy had not yet emerged in public thought, 
this definition was the only way to explain the existence of male-male exchanges. 
The sex worker was simply destitute, and the older, wealthier pervert preyed 
upon that need. Whether this was in fact the case is unclear. A homosexual 
identity was still incredibly difficult to assert, and many of these young men 
could have simply been acting according to their desires, entirely contradicting 
then the popular depiction of coercion and extortion. 
Nonetheless, this framing of the young, exploited male allowed young men 
to engage in homosexual conduct without taking on the condemning social label 
of “homosexual.” This classification, in turn, presumably made public discourse 
about the subject of male prostitution less uncomfortable.  Framing the issue as 
one in which laws were passed to prevent poor, straight men from being forced 
to engage in same-sex prostitution as a means to survive was much less taboo 
than discussing homosexuality and deviancy for their own sake. 
But with the post-World War II shift in the “way in which sexual behaviour 
 
 23.  Scott, supra note 20, at 183. 
 24.  Id. (citing JEFFREY WEEKS, AGAINST NATURE: ESSAYS ON HISTORY, SEXUALITY AND IDENTITY 
(1991); GARRY WOTHERSPOON, CITY OF THE PLAIN: HISTORY OF A GAY SUBCULTURE (1991)). 
 25.  See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 15. 
 26.  Id. at 15-16. 
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was understood and governed”27 came a change in the perception of male-male 
sexual contact, allowing for the start of a popular acceptance of homosexuality as 
an identity rather than a disorder. Kinsey’s reports on human sexuality (1948, 
1965)offered a “‘liberal’ re-interpretation of human sexual behaviour,” and 
“dispensed with earlier static readings of sexual behaviour in favour of a more 
fluid reading.”28 Scott explains during this same time period: 
[a] wide variety of social scientific texts of the period mark[ed] adolescence out 
as a phase of life imbued with great socio-sexual significance. . .Adolescence 
came to be viewed as a problem of governance, particularly in relation to 
‘normal’ sexual development and functioning. Adolescence was identified as the 
site in which sexual identification and desire developed, where life-long sexual 
habits formed, and were [sic] the ‘truth’ of sexual orientation revealed itself.29 
This new view of adolescent sexuality, which perhaps included a broader 
view of homosexuality itself, presented a new problem for the way that society 
viewed the issue of the young, male sex worker. While the view of the male sex 
worker as a young, heterosexual man was in force in the 1950s and 60s, “[w]hat 
rendered male prostitution a governmental problem was the idea that such men 
[‘heterosexual’ male prostitutes] could be ‘treated’ through practical welfare or 
medical interventions.”30 In this way, society was able to incorporate the 
emerging idea that homosexual acts equated to a homosexual desire into its 
depiction of the stereotypical male sex worker. But rather than label the male 
prostitute as a homosexual, the prostitute needed instead only to be “treated” so 
as to avoid falling into homosexuality. 
By defining homosexual desire as a treatable disease, and by characterizing 
male sex workers as homosexuals  motivated by poverty,  (with the fear that 
repeating sexual acts would in itself lead to homosexual desire, or was 
symptomatic of a disordered desire31), the public discourse surrounding male 
prostitution was kept decidedly within the moorings of preventing public harms. 
Scott summarizes a startling depiction of a 19-year-old, white, male homosexual, 
written by Dr. Freyhan, a clinical psychologist, in the 1947 issue of The Delaware 
State Medical Journal: 
The patient, identified by Freyhan as a male prostitute, was said to have adopted 
an ‘aggressive’ homosexuality; that is, he self-identified as homosexual. A 
teacher’s report (included in the study uncritically as evidence) noted that the 
patient’s homosexuality was not of the type normally found in pubescent boys 
and girls, the patient having pursued other males and ‘persuaded’ them to use 
him as a ‘passive’ partner in sexual relations. It was also noted that at one 
institution, in which the patient had previously spent time for committing a petty 
crime, he had corrupted other boys to the extent that he was placed in separate 
 
 27.  Scott, supra note 20, at 183. 
 28.  Id. (citing Alfred C. Kinsey et al., Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male (1948); Alfred C. 
Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (1953)). 
 29.  Scott, supra note 20, at 184. (citing C.M. FLEMING, ADOLESCENCE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(1948); ELIZABETH B. HURLOCK, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (1949); RUDOLPH M. WITTENBERG, 
ADOLESCENCE AND DISCIPLINE: A MENTAL HYGIENE PRIMER (1959)). 
 30.  Scott, supra note 20, at 184. 
 31.  See id. 
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sleeping quarters. Moreover, when he had been arrested by police (not initially 
for prostitution, but for wearing a naval uniform in an unauthorised manner) he 
confessed to police that he had been ‘frilled’ engaging in the pursuit of young 
soldiers and sailors, Freyhan conclude[ed] that he was ‘proud’ of his ability to 
attract other men. Freyhan . . . went on to point out that the absence of any kind 
of self-criticism and inner conflict in the patient ‘proved to be a severe obstacle to 
psychotherapy’, being symptomatic of a psychopathic personality make-up. “As 
such he concluded that lobotomy was the only option left open for ‘treatment’ 
that could curtail the patient’s current behaviour.”32 
The young man’s apparent homosexuality is framed in terms of disorder 
and perversity, describing him as deviant in spite of the fact that he was 
probably only pursuing the same kinds of sexual liaisons with men that a 
heterosexual male would seek from his female peers. 
With subsequent progress in the gay rights movement and growing public 
acceptance of homosexuality, a slow but growing acceptance of the gay identity 
of male sex workers emerged in the academic literature of the 1980s and 90s.33 
Male sex workers were described “as individuals, varied in character but usually 
gay, as much in need of friendship and sexual love as other young people, but 
who happen to have chosen prostitution as a temporary method of surviving in 
impoverished social circumstances.”34 Donald West, who has studied and 
written extensively about male prostitution, imagined a potential counterpart to 
the young, poor, and now gay, male sex worker, describing a “young, 
promiscuously inclined homosexual who finds occasional prostitution a 
congenial and profitable activity, one that brings him into contact with 
interesting people . . . and an exciting lifestyle,” but notes that at the time of his 
writing, “[o]nly exceptionally has published research ventured beyond the full-
time street prostitute [and presumably the prostitute more aligned with the poor-
heterosexual model].”35 
Recent research by Michel Dorais, a professor at McGill University, has 
confirmed that there are indeed numerous backgrounds from which male sex 
workers hail.  Through his analysis of forty accounts taken from interviews with 
current and recently retired male sex workers, he has outlined four “typical life 
patterns” within which his subjects could be classified.36 
Dorais classified his first group, comprising twenty-two of his forty 
respondents, as “outcasts.”37 Their living situation was marked by “dire 
poverty,” “substance abuse,” “the group comprising all confirmed cases of HIV 
transmission,” “the earliest entrants into the sex trade . . . half of them before the 
age of sixteen,” and the group including the “largest number of sexual abuse 
victims.”38 This group most closely maps onto the now-traditional view of male 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See WEST, supra note 6, at xi-xii (discussing recent literature as being markedly different from 
the image of male prostitution displayed in literature prior to gay liberation). 
 34.  Id. at xii. 
 35.  Id. at xiii. 
 36.  DORAIS, supra note 11, at 36. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 36-38. 
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sex workers as predominately young, impoverished, abused, and suffering from 
addiction, and also happens to most closely mirror the stereotypical female, 
street-soliciting, sex worker. Additionally, twenty out of the twenty-two 
“outcasts” “were or had previously been street hustling on a regular (in most 
cases daily) basis; only a few had worked at any time in stripping or escorting.”39 
These “outcasts” report very low levels of self-esteem, viewing themselves as 
worthless due to their need to pursue sex work to meet their monetary needs.40 
In short, the majority of Dorais’ subjects do in fact map onto the image of male 
sex worker as driven to sex work because of poverty, addiction, and abuse, and 
thus seem to have the most to gain from laws outlawing male prostitution.41 
Dorais divides the remaining half of the respondents into three other 
categories. While each category is not mutually exclusive of the others, as some 
respondents had experienced multiple categories throughout their time as sex 
workers, Dorais notes that usually respondents have a predominant pattern.42 
The second group he deems “part-timers” who work as sex-workers to 
“make ends meet” while maintaining another job.43 “Part-timers” entered sex 
work between the ages of twenty-two and forty, a later age than men in other 
categories, and worked primarily as strippers if heterosexual, or escorts if 
homosexual.44 These men, due to the reputational costs of having a “real” job and 
due to some of them identifying as homosexual, tend to keep their work discreet; 
they often garner some degree of self-affirmation from their work, and an overall 
level of self-esteem, in contrast with the “outcasts”.45 
The third group is made up of “insiders,” or “young men who have grown 
up in or around the sex trade to the point that they come to view it as their 
primary social circle.”46 These men do not view sex work as a last resort, but as 
“something natural, an honourable living.”47 These men also entered the sex 
trade at an early age, between fifteen and twenty-one, but unlike the “outcasts” 
they maintain a positive self-image and have relatively stable friendships and 
relationships.48 
 
 39.  Id. at 38. 
 40.  Id. at 37-38. 
 41.  If we accept the view that laws banning prostitution benefit those who stand to gain most 
monetarily, the very poor. Removing prostitution as a possible avenue of employment benefits them, 
as in so banning, we affirm the social value of sex as something that is de-valued through the 
commodification thereof, and refuse to allow their commoditized sex to dehumanize them. This 
argument has of course been questioned by many academics, but I will refrain from critiquing it, if 
only because for purposes of constitutional analysis, the proposed governmental interest in 
promoting sex between consenting adults free from the possibly coercive effects of poverty that lead 
to selling sexual services would clearly withstand even the lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis 
review. 
 42.  DORAIS, supra note 11, at 38-39. 
 43.  Id. at 39. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 39-40. 
 46.  Id. at 40. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. at 40-41. (4.1) 
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The final group Dorais terms “liberationists,” “for whom prostitution is a 
way of living out fantasies, exploring new experiences and partners, and 
profiting from these discoveries.”49 This group maps most closely to West’s 
vision of the “young, promiscuously inclined, homosexual.”50 Dorais argues that 
this group most challenges preconceived notions of male prostitution, since for 
these men, the work “has the potential to be gratifying and affirming under the 
right circumstances and with the right clients.”51 These men had, on average, 
higher levels of education than men from other groups, and viewed sex work as 
an “opportunity to affirm their sexual orientation or preference and to grow as 
an individual.”52 Men from this group also seem to present the most cogent 
argument for differing treatment of male and female sex workers, as they do not 
seem in need of any of the social protections that banning prostitution promises. 
Instead, this group could be seen as providing a social good of sorts, a sexual 
service to those men incapable of finding a consenting partner, while 
simultaneously reaping a monetary reward without the costs to self that are 
associated with the “outcast” class. 
In summary, the history of male prostitution is one in which Western 
society has done its best to ingrain heteronormative ideas of dominant-masculine 
and submissive-feminine identities onto the client and sex worker respectively. 
With this mapping came the assumption that the male sex worker, as a genetic 
male and naturally dominant being, is forced into sex work due to poverty, 
abuse, addiction, and other circumstances, all falling within the “outcast” 
category, and will subsequently experience depression and low self-esteem. The 
existence of the “part-timer,” the “insider,” and the “liberationist,” each in his 
own way freed from the traditional concerns of drug abuse and poverty that 
plague the “outcast,” challenges the strict mapping of the equivalence of female-
male and male-male sex work, which I will further explore through the analysis 
of the laws and enforcement policies of the government vis-à-vis the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.53 
The Fourteenth Amendment was introduced by the Reconstruction 
Congress in the wake of the Civil War to protect the newly granted citizenship 
rights of freed black slaves from explicitly discriminatory legislation in 
 
 49.  Id. at 41. 
 50.  See WEST, supra note 6, at xiii. 
 51.  DORAIS, supra note 11, at 43. 
 52.  Id. at 41-42. 
 53.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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previously Confederate states.54 This new amendment was quickly tested in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, in which the Supreme Court drastically limited the scope 
of the amendment’s privileges and immunities clause, essentially stating that it 
“did not provide general federal protection for citizens against state regulation. 
Rather, it protected only a few rights, ‘which ow[e] their existence to the Federal 
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.’”55  
The day after deciding the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court used 
its newly minted rule of protecting only those rights owing their existence to the 
Federal government in Bradwell v. Illinois, and in so doing, began to outline the 
Court’s eventual approach to “real” differences between the sexes.56 In Bradwell, 
the Court upheld an Illinois statute that refused to license a woman as a lawyer, 
holding “that the right to practice law was not a privilege or immunity of 
national citizenship and therefore was not protected by the fourteenth 
amendment.”57 While Justice Bradley dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases, 
arguing that “a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a 
lawful [employment deprives] them of liberty as well as property, without due 
process of law,”58 he articulated what would later become the “real difference” 
doctrine when he wrote in Bradwell: 
[the] natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the 
family organization which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to 
the domain and functions of womanhood.59 
Justice Bradley’s words, though now 140 years out of date, shows the 
troubling beginnings of the Supreme Court’s thinking in regards to gender 
distinctions. By creating differing spheres for men and women, the Court began 
to blaze a dangerous path that would allow some discrimination on the basis of 
gender, if not through application of antiquated norms of motherhood and 
family due to the application of patriarchal and heteronormative thinking 
channeled through language of biological “real” differences. 
The Court finally changed its stance on gender discrimination in the 1970s, 
first with Reed v. Reed.60 The case involved an Idaho statute governing the estates 
of persons who died intestate, granting a preference to men over women as 
administrators by, specifically stating that “of several persons claiming and 
equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females.”61 The Court 
issued a unanimous opinion that the statute in question violated the Equal 
 
 54.  See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452 (6th ed. 2009) (ratified on July 28, 
1868). 
 55.   Id. at 453 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)). 
 56.   See generally Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 57.   STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 619. 
 58.   Id. at 619-20 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 122). 
 59.   Id. at 620 (quoting Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141). 
 60.   See 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1977). 
 61.   Id. at 72 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (repealed 1972)). 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Chief Justice Berger, writing 
for the majority, wrote that the relevant standard to be applied to gender 
classifications was “whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants 
[bears] a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by 
the operation of [the statute].”63 The State argued that the classification provided 
for the distinction and appointment of an administrator when presented with 
two equal candidates only differing in gender. The Court rejected this as “the 
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection 
Clause.”64 
The Reed Court asserted that it was applying a rational basis test to gender.65 
As such, the decision, while indeed a move to protect women, is somewhat 
troubling from a doctrinal sense. Under normal rational basis review, with its 
high level of deference, a statutory provision must be “rationally related” to a 
“legitimate” government interest,66 and a “legitimate interest” need only be a 
hypothetical one, not one actually articulated by the government at the time of 
passing the suspect law.67 Using regular rational basis, it would seem that 
Idaho’s need to distinguish between persons, and the use of this gendered 
methodology, would probably be allowed. 
The Court began to move away from the application of rational basis review 
in Frontiero v. Richardson.68 The challenged statute was a federal law under which 
“a male member of the uniformed armed services could automatically claim his 
spouse as a dependent . . . [whereas] a female service member could claim 
comparable benefits only if she demonstrated that her spouse was in fact 
dependent on her for over half his support.”69 Though the Court was unable to 
author a majority opinion, eight of the justices agreed that the law violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.70 Writing for four of the justices, Justice Brennan argued 
that like racial classifications, gender distinctions should similarly receive 
heightened scrutiny.71 Brennan noted that many “stereotyped distinctions” are 
present in many statutes, and justified heighted scrutiny by acknowledging that 
“the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society.”72 Justice Powell wrote a concurrence, joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, wherein he expressly rejected the need to 
apply a heightened classification to gender, arguing that it was not necessary to 
 
 62.   Reed, 404 U.S. at 74. 
 63.  STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 621 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 76). 
 64.  Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938) (defining and 
applying the standard for normal rational basis review). 
 67.  See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 641 (17th ed. 2010) 
(“Such [rationality] review does not demand anything approaching a perfect fit to an actual purpose; 
any conceivably rational basis is enough.”). 
 68.   See generally 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 69.   STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 622. 
 70.   See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (plurality opinion). 
 71.   See id. at 688. 
 72.   Id. at 686. 
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decide what level of scrutiny gender classifications warranted in light of Reed’s 
use of rational basis and the similarly groundless discrimination in Frontiero.73 
While Justice Brennan’s opinion did make progress, acknowledging the long-
suffered discrimination against women that existed in statutes, his caveat that 
such distinctions “frequently” do not bear any relation to ability is still troubling, 
because it allowed for the later doctrine of “real differences” to develop around 
what many would argue are differences, based only in slightly less offensive 
traditions of the female as a disadvantaged gender. 
In Craig v. Boren, the Court finally adopted intermediate scrutiny as we 
know it today.74 An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of 3.2% alcohol beer to 
men under the age of 21, but to women under the age of 18.75 The question was 
“whether such a gender-based differential constitute[d] a denial to males 18-20 
years of age of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”76 Justice Brennan articulated the new test, intermediate scrutiny, 
as one where “classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,” 
clarifying that the statute must be “substantially related to achievement of the 
statutory objective.”77 Oklahoma argued that the statute enhanced traffic safety, 
showing statistical evidence that more men aged 18-20 were arrested for drunk 
driving than women of the same age.78 But the Court found that the statute’s use 
of gender to prevent a marginal difference in drunk driving incidents was “an 
unduly tenuous ‘fit,’” and that “the showing offered by the appellees [the 
legislature] does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for 
the regulation of drinking and driving.”79 It is somewhat ironic, through perhaps 
not surprising, that the intermediate scrutiny test emerged out of a law that 
discriminated against men; nevertheless, this test has become the Court’s 
approach to gender distinctions in law. 
But intermediate scrutiny, with its test of “substantially related” to 
“important objectives,” is not the same as strict scrutiny’s test that there must be 
a “compelling governmental interest” to which purpose the statute is “narrowly 
tailored”, and also constitutes the “least restrictive means” for achieving that 
purpose.80 “Important objectives” are doubtless different from “compelling 
interests,” as is “substantially related” different from “narrowly tailored” and 
“least restrictive.” In practice, this has led the Court to allow some separate but 
equal treatment of men and women, as well as acknowledge real and inherent 
differences between the two. 
In United States v. Virginia (the Virginia Military Institute case), the Court 
 
 73.   See id. at 691-92. 
 74.  See 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
 75.  Id. at 197. 
 76.  Id. at 192. 
 77.  Id. at 197, 204. 
 78.  See id. at 225 (showing that 2% of men, compared to only .18% of women, aged 18-20 are 
arrested for drunk driving). 
 79.   Id. at 202, 204. 
 80.   See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 702 (2007) 
(describing the strict scrutiny test applied to matters concerning race). 
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struck down the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) policy of only admitting 
men.81 The case is particularly instructive in the way it outlines acceptable 
governmental purposes for treating men and women differently, as well as the 
burden of the state in defending these distinctions. Justice Ginsberg, writing for 
the majority, arguably strengthens the intermediate scrutiny test, explaining that 
the government must have an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its action 
and that the “burden of justification is demanding” and “rests entirely on the 
State.”82 The Court clarifies that it believes there are differences at play between 
men and women: 
Supposed “inherent differences” are no longer accepted as a ground for race or 
national origin classifications. . .Physical differences between men and women, 
however, are enduring. . . “Inherent differences” between men and women, we 
have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of 
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s 
opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women “for 
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promote equal 
employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the talent and 
capacities of our Nation’s people. “But such classifications may not be used, as 
they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority 
of women.”83 
The Court first found that the all female program of VMI’s sister school the 
Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership did not offer an equivalent education 
to that of VMI (which would presumably have provided an acceptable reason for 
either school to deny admittance on the basis of gender).84 Next, the Court found 
that the differences of sex, which would require alterations necessary to ensure 
privacy, did not justify excluding women from admission (i.e. that the physical 
requirements imposed by VMI’s style of education were not too much for a 
woman to bear).85 
The Court has, however, upheld a few gender-based classifications, even 
under the intermediate scrutiny test. In Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior 
Court, “the Court upheld a statute defining statutory rape as ‘an act of sexual 
intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where 
the female is under the age of 18 years.’”86 The Court reasoned that the State’s 
interest in preventing illegitimate pregnancies was a strong one, and that 
“punish[ing] only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the 
consequences of his conduct,” was well within the legislature’s purview, 
especially when “the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence 
to young females.”87 
 
 81.   518 U.S. 515, 519, 558 (1996). 
 82.   Id. at 524, 533 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724). 
 83.   Virginia Military Institute Case, 518 U.S. at 534 (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 
(1948)). 
 84.   See Virginia Military Institute Case, 518 U.S. at 534. 
 85.   See id. at 534, 551, 558. 
 86.   STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 647 (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 
450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981)). 
 87.   Michael M., 450 U.S. at 464-65, 473. 
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Similarly, in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, the Court 
upheld a federal law requiring that the child of a male U.S. citizen born abroad 
must file more documentation of parentage to gain citizenship than if the mother 
of the child were a U.S. citizen.88 The governmental interest at issue was “the 
importance of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists.”89 In the 
case of the mother, the relation “is verifiable from the birth itself.”90 Nguyen 
seems less offensive as an example of “real differences” as it is indeed much 
easier to establish maternity than paternity given the fact that the woman must 
give birth. But Michael M.’s reasoning is a bit more troubling. While the state may 
indeed have an interest in deterring illegitimate pregnancies, is it enough of a 
real difference to justify criminalizing the male behavior? Yes, a child is a 
significant burden, but to equate the burden of a child to the burden of carrying a 
criminal rape conviction seems disproportionate. Again, the Court seems to feel 
the need to protect stereotypically weak women from the lusts of young men, 
and does so by over-punishing the male partner who may have been equally, or 
even less, responsible for the sexual episode. 
Regardless, this line of thinking about “real differences” in Equal Protection 
cases dealing with gender is a difficult subject. Returning to the power of societal 
discourse itself, Catherine MacKinnon has written that accepting these “real 
differences” may in fact support male domination of society: The idea of gender 
difference helps keep the reality of male dominance in place. . . Difference is the 
velvet glove on the iron fist of domination. This is as true when differences are 
affirmed as when they are denied, when their substance is applauded or when it 
is disparaged, when women are punished or [when] they are protected in their 
name. A sex inequality is not a difference gone wrong, a lesson the law of sex 
discrimination has yet to learn. One of the most deceptive anti-feminisms in 
society, scholarship, politics, and law is the persistent treatment of gender as if it 
truly is a question of difference, rather than treating the gender difference as a 
construct of the difference gender makes.91 
In short, by making distinctions of any sort, women are inherently kept 
separate, and are thus subjugated, to male dominance. Even measures which 
would seek to protect women inherently associate femininity with weakness. 
Acknowledging differences of any sort opens the door for comparison, and in 
that comparison, women usually lose. 
There are several cases in which the acknowledgement of “differences” is 
clearly suspect. In Kahn v. Shevin, the Court upheld a property tax exemption for 
widows but not for widowers on the grounds that there are greater financial 
difficulties confronting a lone woman than there are a lone man.92 Similarly, in 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, the Court upheld a Naval policy giving women more time 
to achieve a mandatory promotion before being discharged, arguing that 
remedial measures that advantage women who have been historically 
 
 88.   See 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001). 
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Id. at 54. 
 91.   STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 652 (quoting CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES  ON LIFE AND LAW  3, 8-9 (1987)). 
 92.   416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974). 
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disadvantaged are permissible.93 In both of these cases the Court implied, if it did 
not directly state, that women in society confront more problems in the 
workforce, struggling to make money and to be successful in a male dominated 
world. But rather than insist on the equality of the sexes and rule these two laws 
unconstitutional, the Court instead believed itself to be helping women to catch 
up. What they were perhaps failing to consider is MacKinnon’s argument that by 
acknowledging some differences, we are simply reinforcing and retrenching the 
inequality that we seek to stamp out, and perhaps even seeing difference 
through the lens of male dominance and patriarchy where none exists. 
By legally allowing for some “real” differences, we as a society may in fact 
be reinforcing older, discriminatory stereotypes both about the nature of 
heterosexual sex and about homosexual interactions as well. MacKinnon’s 
argument can easily extend into the problems that we might see when 
comparing past legislation, which often directly targeted only male-female sex 
work by only criminalizing opposite-sex interactions rather than same-sex 
interaction. In addition, many more resources of today’s police departments are 
used to stop opposite-sex rather than same-sex sex work. By calling the two 
types of interactions “different” on the basis of gender, we inherently read in 
weakness to the woman in the female-male interaction, and a strength and lack 
of public protection for the male sex worker engaged in same sex exchanges. 
III. LEGISLATIVE DISCRIMINATION IN THE PAST 
It is clear that some states conceived of homosexual interactions as 
occurring completely outside the context of traditional sex work and 
prostitution, instead using the discourse of non-naturality to stigmatize 
homosexual conduct as disordered and criminal behavior. Historically, anti-
prostitution laws were frequently written so as only to target opposite-sex 
interactions, leaving same-sex interaction to anti-sodomy statutes, but without 
the stigma of the “prostitution” label. These laws sought only to target the 
traditional opposite-sex interactions that comfortably fit within a 
heteronormative model of sexual behavior, leaving the possibility of homosexual 
sex for pay completely outside the criminal label of “prostitution.” While this 
perhaps gave male prostitutes an advantage by removing them from the criminal 
penalties associated with prostitution, it doubtless left them subject to the 
harsher penalties of these “unnatural acts” statutes, which were much harsher. 
Many of these statutes were on the books until relatively recently. For 
example, in Mississippi, only procuring female prostitutes was covered, with a 
recommended penalty of six-months in prison for the crime (by either a party 
looking to sell or buy).94 By contrast, homosexual interactions, whether for pay or 
merely consensual, are covered under Mississippi’s “unnatural intercourse” 
statute, which carries a hefty ten-year penalty for both parties.95 While Lawrence 
v. Texas96 doubtless made the latter “unnatural intercourse” statute 
 
 93.   See 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). 
 94.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-51, 53 (1972). 
 95.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (West 2013). 
 96.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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unconstitutional, the offending statute is still present in the Mississippi code. 
Louisiana similarly worded their prostitution statute, writing: 
Prostitution is the practice by a female of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with 
males for compensation. 
Whoever commits the crime of prostitution shall be fined not more than one 
hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.97 
This statute, as later construed by law enforcement and the court system of 
Louisiana, explicitly excludes men from the profession, and the relatively lax 
punishment, leaving them subject to other statutes with much harsher 
sentences.98 
These laws criminalizing only opposite-sex sex work were also upheld as 
constitutional despite cries that they violated the Equal Protection Clause. In 
State v. Devall, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the federal 
constitutionality of the above-referenced statute.99 The court itself acknowledged 
that the challenged statute only criminalized the selling of sex by women (to 
either female or male clients).100 While this court was operating without the 
intermediate scrutiny standard laid out in Craig v. Boren, Frontiero v. Richardson 
had already been decided, and with it the move towards including gender as a 
protected class. But because no majority had emerged in Frontiero, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court used a rational basis analysis in examining the constitutionality 
of the law.101 The court acknowledged Reed, but limited its impact to only 
disallowing the use of gender to eliminate a class from consideration for a 
benefit.102 They instead cited to Goesaert v. Cleary, a case decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1948.103 In Goesaert, the Court upheld a Michigan statute which 
denied women bartending licenses unless they were the wife or daughter of the 
male owner of a tavern.104 The Louisiana court summarized the import of the 
case by writing that “a statute may make a distinction without violating the 
constitutional guarantee, if the classification is a natural and reasonable one.”105 
The court found that the defendant had not presented any evidence to show that 
“male prostitution is a social problem of any importance” and “[t]he Constitution 
does not and should not require the legislature, before attempting to regulate an 
existing practice which is detrimental to the public welfare, to regulate a practice 
which is not.”106 
The court reveals a distinct bias in these statements. First, the court assumes 
that it is “natural and reasonable” to classify women as the class more likely to 
 
 97.  State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909, 910 (La. 1974) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:82, as it 
appeared in 1974). 
 98.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (1974) (amended 2013). 
 99.  See Devall, 302 So. 2d at 910. 
 100.  See id. 
 101.  Id. at 912-13. 
 102.  Id. at 912. 
 103.  335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
 104.  See id. at 467. 
 105.  Devall, 302 So. 2d at 911. (citing Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 468). 
 106.  Id. at 912. 
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engage in prostitution, without offering any reasons for that assumption other 
than perhaps some commonly held, but mistaken, social knowledge. But the 
second statement reveals that this assumption runs even deeper to the point that 
the court cannot imagine that male sex work occurs absent a concrete showing by 
the defendant of its existence. While the burden to overcome rational basis 
review doubtlessly rested on the defendant to demonstrate that male prostitution 
was not merely a theoretical matter, the language of the court begs the question: 
how much data would be enough to lift the issue of male sex work to a “social 
problem of any importance” such that the court would feel it had to intervene? 
The court concludes with this statement: 
[A]bsent a showing that distinctions involving prostitution are merely pretexts 
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or 
the other [and thus trigger the sort of Equal Protection offered post-Reed], 
lawmakers are constitutionally free to exclude male prostitution from the 
coverage of legislation on the reasonable basis that it does not constitute a social 
problem. Differences between the sexes does bear a rational relationship to the 
prohibition of prostitution by females.107 
In this decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court not only upheld a gendered 
version of the state anti-prostitution statute against equal protection violation, it 
also confirmed the contemporary societal view of male, and most often male-
male sex work as something completely outside the heteronormative model of 
the traditional heterosexual prostitution exchange. To recognize that same-sex 
interactions occur frequently would place the court in the uncomfortable position 
of admitting homosexual sex workers into the definitional ranks of prostitutes at 
large. 
In much the same way that some conservatives fear that allowing gay 
marriage will mar the term “marriage” for opposite-sex couples, admitting 
homosexual men into the category “prostitute” could be seen as equally altering 
the definition of prostitution itself. Admittedly, “marriage” has usually been a 
positive term in society, whereas “prostitute” has carried a negative burden, but 
one which homosexuals were denied to carry even if they wanted it. To 
acknowledge male sex workers would be to acknowledge, and legitimate 
through discourse, the existence of homosexuality, or taken to a lesser extreme, 
the existence of men forced into selling sex in order to survive. To admit the 
former into the term “prostitute” could remove the disordered connotation, 
because while some female sex workers are doubtless seen as in need of mental 
help, the profession also includes semi-respectable call women trying to earn a 
living. To admit the poor heterosexual male forced into same-sex exchanges into 
the category could be seen as removing the stigma from gay-for-pay interactions 
by giving it the valid, though admittedly still stigmatized, label of prostitution 
rather than that of “unnatural act.” 
While the Louisiana Supreme Court probably did not consciously 
acknowledge the meaning of its assumptions, analyzing them reveals that, at 
least in Louisiana in the 1970s, little progress was being made both in terms of 
acknowledging the existence of male sex workers, nor in granting homosexuality 
 
 107.  Id. at 912-13. 
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any sort of label which would grant it an equivalent social status even to 
“prostitution.” And while the justice system might like to believe itself an 
objective voice relatively removed from societal influence, the very terms in 
which it speaks are evident that it is doubtless influenced by the public 
consciousness. Louisiana was not alone in its thinking either, with supreme 
courts of both Indiana108 and Wisconsin109 making similar decisions on similar 
grounds. 
It seems that in the years following these decisions, with the Craig v. Boren 
intermediate scrutiny in place in 1976, gendered prostitution statutes would have 
been quickly deemed unconstitutional due to the lack of a substantial 
relationship to the important government interest of preventing prostitution. 
Had the issue ever reached the Supreme Court, it would presumably have ruled 
that these laws impermissibly targeted women and not men. But the case history 
did not need to move in this direction. It seems that many states in fact had 
gender-neutral prostitution statutes on their books, and so the case history post-
Craig v. Boren is one in which the courts examine whether enforcement in a 
gender-biased manner is in fact a violation of Equal Protection. Importantly, the 
discussion of these cases still hinges on whether, and to what degree, we accept 
the existence of male-male sex exchanges and homosexuality at large. 
IV. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
Before discussing enforcement of anti-sex work statutes, one would 
naturally ask, how much of the total sex-work pie is actually composed of male 
sex workers? We know that although “the ratio of female to male prostitutes is 
unclear,”110 women account for some ninety percent of the total arrests made 
under prostitution statutes.111 Law enforcement officials sometimes point to 
common policies of using male officers to target female prostitutes as a reason 
for these numbers.112 While these numbers do not answer the important question 
as to what percentage of all sex work is actually engaged in by men selling 
services, the admission of law enforcement officials that they do in fact more 
often target women serves to demonstrate that female sex work is more sought 
out by law enforcement than its male counterpart. This sort of selective 
enforcement is covered by constitutional law through a chain of Supreme Court 
decisions. 
 
 108.  See Wilson v. State, 278 N.E.2d 569, 571 (Ind. 1972). 
 109.  See State v. Mertes, 210 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Wis. 1973). 
 110.  Alysa Castro, Note, Student Note: Better in Theory: The Road to Prostitution Reform in 
Pennsylvania, 9 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 48-49 (2012) (citing Jacqueline Cooke & Melissa L. 
Sontag, Sixth Annual Review Of Gender and Sexuality Law: II. Criminal Law Chapter: Prostitution, 6 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 459, 470 (2005); Gregg Aronson, Seeking a Consolidated Feminist Voice for Prostitution in the 
US, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 357, 378 (2006)). 
 111.  Castro, supra note 110, at 49 (citing Jessica N. Drexler, Comment, Governments’ Role in 
Turning Tricks: The World’s Oldest Profession in the Netherlands and the United States, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 
201, 214 (1996)); Aronson, supra note 109, at 378. 
 112.  Castro, supra note 110, at 49 (citing Coty R. Miller & Nuria Haltiwanger, Prostitution and the 
Legalization/Decriminalization Debate, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 207, 228 (2004); Cooke & Sontag, supra 
note 109, at 477). 
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The Supreme Court famously ruled in Yick Wo v. Hopkins that the 
discriminatory administration of a facially neutral statute violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113 While the case dealt with the 
granting of laundry licenses in a manner that effectively discriminated against 
Chinese Americans, the Court’s language in no way limits the doctrine of 
discriminatory administration only to victims of racial discrimination: 
[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a 
particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, 
whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are 
applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus 
representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount 
to a practical denial by the State of [equal] protection of the laws.114 
While Yick Wo has not been cited by the Court in relation to any case 
dealing with gender discrimination, it is reasonable to assume that were the 
Court to employ it for that purpose, the discriminatory, or selective, enforcement 
would need to withstand intermediate scrutiny itself, namely through substantial 
relation to an important governmental interest.115 Yick Wo’s holding was 
extended to discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws through Oyler v. Boles, 
though it did allow the “‘conscious exercise of some selectivity’ in criminal law 
enforcement as long as the selectivity is not based on ‘an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’”116 Presumably, those 
unjustifiable standards would include gender today. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court defended the decision of selective 
enforcement of its prostitution law against an Equal Protection attack in 1976 in 
City of Minneapolis v. Buschette.117 Buschette complained that the City of 
Minneapolis had violated her Equal Protection rights by conducting police stings 
against sex workers when they had put forth no similar efforts against their 
predominantly male customers.118 The statute under which Buschette was 
charged is gender neutral, and read as follows: “No person, in any public or 
private place, shall offer or submit his or her body indiscriminately for sexual 
intercourse, whether or not for a consideration.”119 The court made note of a 
series of important facts: 
 
 113.  See 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in 
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered . . . so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal 
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”). 
 114.  STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 537 (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373). 
 115.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous 
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
 116.  Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 205-06 (Mass. 1977) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 
 117.  See 240 N.W.2d 500, 504-05 (Minn. 1976) (notably the same year of the Craig decision, but the 
court here is using the rational basis scrutiny of Reed). 
 118.  Id. at 501. 
 119.  Id. (citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 870.110). 
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A. Minneapolis Code of Ordinances, s 870.110, under which defendant is 
charged, applies equally to men and to women; 
B. All nine permanent members of the Minneapolis morals squad are men; 
C. An important function of the morals squad, as articulated by its then chief 
officer, Sergeant Jon Prentice, is to eliminate or control prostitution on the 
streets of the city; 
D. In the performance of this important duty, the morals squad officer makes 
himself available for propositions by suspicious women by acting in the role 
of decoy or, in the argot of the profession as the ‘trick’; 
E. One hundred ninety adults were charged with prostitution between March 
31, 1972, and August 28, 1973, of whom 172 were women and 18, men; 
F. On only one occasion, in March 1972, a policewoman was used by the morals 
squad as a decoy, and she effected the arrest of 7 of the above 18 men for the 
offense of prostitution; 
G. Of the remaining 11 men, most, if not all, were female impersonators; 
H. Since August 28, 1973, and until October 26, 1973, 29 persons were arrested by 
the morals squad and charged with prostitution, 17 of them being female 
and 12 of them being male; 
I. Of the 12 males arrested by morals squad officers, none of them was arrested 
for offering to take money from a female to perform an act of sexual intercourse 
with her, but all were arrested after they attempted to solicit a female police 
officer by offering her money to do so with them; . . . .  
. . . . 
L. It is the current intention of the morals squad to continue apprehension of 
males as well as females who are engaged in prostitution.120 
It is important to note that the large majority of those people arrested 
between March 31, 1972 and October 26, 1973 were female and not male. Those 
men who were arrested were either trying to solicit a female officer for sex or 
were themselves impersonating women (and perhaps would have identified as 
women or transgender today). Notably, the facts do not make a single mention of 
any sort of same-sex interactions in the city’s anti-sex work efforts. 
The court allowed the statute to be subject to a claim of selective 
enforcement of the sort described in Yick Wo, and went  so far as to list a number 
of cases that expanded that doctrine to other types of laws.121 The court described 
the claim as one in which the “defense has the burden of producing evidence of 
discrimination by a clear preponderance of the evidence. If such intentional and 
purposeful discriminatory enforcement is shown, the court has the remedy of 
dismissing the charge against the defendant.”122 In Buschette’s case, the court 
found that she not only failed to  produce evidence of only female arrests, but 
 
 120.  Buschette, 240 N.W.2d at 501-02. 
 121.  See id. at 502-03. 
 122.  Id. at 503-04. 
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that it was the stated intent of the police chief to arrest men and women sex 
workers.123 
The defendant made the argument that the statistical disparity between 
female sex worker arrests to male sex-seeker arrests was enough to show 
discriminatory enforcement.124 In response, the court employed a rational basis 
review of the decision, and trusted Minneapolis’ assertion that it was more 
efficient to concentrate on the assumedly female “‘sellers of sexual services, 
rather than on the buyers.’”125 The court concluded that there was indeed, “a 
rational relationship between that selectivity and the governmental objective of 
controlling prostitution.”126 
It is worth noting that in its determination about whether the statute 
violates Reed’s rational basis review of an Equal Protection claim, the court 
assumes that the sellers of sex are predominately female and the buyers 
predominately male’. The defendant herself did not express that the violation 
might not lay in targeting female sex workers more than male solicitors of 
females, but in the statistical selective enforcement against women. If she had 
brought this argument, the court would have needed to engage in a Yick Wo 
analysis similar to that used in her first claim of selective enforcement against 
female sex workers and not males. But the court already ruled that the 
enforcement schema could not be shown to be discriminatory against women as 
the defendant had not presented evidence of discrimination. The evidence of that 
discrimination would presumably be the statistics of arrests of women for 
prostitution as opposed to those of men who were similarly selling sexual 
services (even if they were doing so in drag).  While the court respected those 
statistics enough to engage in rational basis review in regards to the disparity in 
arrests of women for selling services to arrests of men seeking them, it somehow 
discredited that same data set for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory 
enforcement between genders of sex workers, instead trusting implicitly the 
police chief’s clearly contradicted assertion that he intends to arrest both men 
and women.  
Buschette would probably have had to provide evidence that same-sex 
interactions were in fact occurring (outside the transgendered ones documented) 
before she could assert that the selective enforcement was indeed discriminatory. 
The enforcement policy of the city, which provided no documentation that same-
sex interactions were occurring (again, outside of those transgendered ones that 
the court and city seem to map onto a more societally palatable, heteronormative 
exchange), meant that the burden on Buschette would have been heavy indeed. 
She would have had to produce some evidence of those interactions. The court’s 
assumptions, and the enforcement policy itself, are another demonstration of the 
way in which the law, and its enforcement mechanism, turned a blind eye to 
same-sex exchanges, both in mapping those same-sex exchanges that were 
recorded in a heteronormative manner, and by failing to target any openly same-
sex exchanges. 
 
 123.  Id. at 504. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 505. 
 126.  Id. at 506. 
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Massachusetts came to a similar ruling in Commonwealth v. King in 1977, but 
with an important distinction.127 Here, the defendant was charged with 
prostitution, and as part of her claim that discriminatory enforcement violated 
her Equal Protection rights, presented evidence, through the arresting officer’s 
testimony, that it was “the practice of the vice squad division of the Boston police 
department to file such complaints against only females.”128  The Supreme 
Judicial Court disregarded this evidence, instead conjecturing that the officer’s 
testimony was not necessarily the official position of the department at large, and 
that male sex workers were perhaps being prosecuted under other laws covering 
similar conduct instead of the anti-prostitution statute.129 Again, the burden 
would be on the defendant to seek out data about the prevalence of same-sex 
exchanges and the failure of the police department to enforce against them before 
her claim of discriminatory enforcement could stand.  Absent concrete evidence 
of both, her claim could not proceed. The court here did seem to allow the 
assumption that same-sex exchanges were taking place,130 but in a similar fashion 
to the Buschette case, demanded a high level of proof of selective enforcement 
before it would even hear the claim. 
The court surprisingly did not end the case there, and instead continued to 
outline what such a claim of discriminatory enforcement would look like, though 
it must have known that discussion would in fact be considered dicta. The court 
recognized the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment as granting strict 
scrutiny to distinctions made on the basis of gender, and also cited to Yick Wo 
and Oyler in extending that review to cases of discriminatory enforcement in 
criminal proceedings.131 The court concluded that given Massachusetts’ 
prohibition of sex discrimination and the constitutional framework against 
discriminatory enforcement: 
[T]he Commonwealth cannot enforce [the anti-prostitution statute] against 
female prostitutes but not against male prostitutes unless it can demonstrate a 
compelling interest which requires such a policy. 
The defendant bears the initial burden of alleging and showing, prima facie, 
selective enforcement of the law on the basis of sex, because we presume that 
criminal arrests and prosecutions are undertaken in good faith, without intent to 
discriminate.132 
The case represents progress. The Court openly assumes that same-sex 
exchanges do indeed take place and that selective enforcement against female sex 
 
 127.  See Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Mass. 1977). 
 128.  Id.; See also id. at 204-05 (the defendants also attempted to present statistical evidence at the 
appellate level that showed that the police failed to prosecute male prostitutes which they had not 
presented at trial; the court ignored that evidence in its determinations). 
 129.  Id. at 205. 
 130.  See id. (“It is left entirely conjectural in the record before us whether males who solicited for 
or engages in sexual relations for hire, but were not arrested for prostitution, were charged instead 
with any number of other applicable criminal offenses including: . . . the common law crime of 
soliciting for an unnatural act . . . .”). 
 131.  See id. at 205-06. 
 132.  Id. at 207. 
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workers would indeed be a violation of the Massachusetts Constitution given its 
Equal Rights Amendment, but still leaves the burden of proving that 
discrimination squarely in the defendant’s lap, and with a rather high standard 
of proof that seems difficult to meet. 133 
Not surprisingly, there are few cases addressing this issue. The cases above 
give us two options to approach Equal Protection claims arising from gender 
neutral anti-prostitution laws that seem to be enforced only or predominately 
against female-male exchanges; either the defendant must demonstrate only that 
enforcement is biased (the liberal approach taken by a state like Massachusetts), 
or carry the burden both that enforcement is biased, and that the bias does not 
meet intermediate scrutiny’s necessity of bearing a substantial relationship to an 
important governmental interest.134 In my final section, I will address the 
potential arguments that might be employed to justify selective enforcement 
against only female-male exchanges, and analyze the discursive problems that 
underlie these arguments. 
V. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AND “REAL” DIFFERENCES FOR PURPOSES OF 
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
The case law discussed has demonstrated that under federal law a statute is 
subject to intermediate scrutiny when it distinguishes between classes of people 
on the basis of gender,135or heightened scrutiny in states with an Equal Rights 
Amendment,136 and that those statutes which are selectively enforced in a 
discriminatory manner may also violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment if they do not survive the appropriate level of 
 
 133.  The Supreme Judicial Court later revisited the issue of selective enforcement in 
Commonwealth v. Franklin. 385 N.E.2d 227, 233-34 (Mass. 1978). The court clarified the burden of the 
defendant: 
In order to meet the initial burden in raising a reasonable inference of impermissible 
discrimination, defendants must demonstrate (1) ‘that a broader class of persons than those 
prosecuted has violated the law,’ (2) ‘that failure to prosecute was either consistent or 
deliberate,’ and (3) ‘that the decision not to prosecute was based on an impermissible 
classification such as race, religion, or sex.’ Once a defendant has satisfied this tripartite 
burden, the prosecution must rebut the inference or suffer a dismissal of the underlying 
claim. 
 
Mara Shulman Ryan, Note, Criminal Law—Invisible in the Courtroom Too: Modifying the Law 
of Selective Enforcement to Account for White Privilege, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 312 (2012) 
(citing Franklin, 385 N.E.2d at 233-34). 
 
While this standard is somewhat clearer, it still places a heavy burden on a presumably 
female defendant sex worker to produce evidence that same-sex exchanges are in fact 
occurring and that the police department consistently fails to enforce the same anti-
prostitution law against those same-sex interactions. 
 134.  I arrive at this second approach by first acknowledging a dearth of jurisprudence in the 
federal courts. Following the lines of both constitutional case law relating to discriminatory 
enforcement and Equal Protection, as well as gender distinctions and Equal Protection, I believe a 
defendant would need to demonstrate violations on both levels in order to establish any sort of case 
of precedential value. 
 135.  See discussion supra Part III. 
 136.  See King, 372 N.E.2d at 206. 
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scrutiny.137 “Real differences” have included the ability to get pregnant,138 a 
history of difficulties in the workplace,139 and a history of financial difficulty 
generally,140 but as the Court said in VMI, “such classifications may not be used, 
as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women.”141 If the statute is facially neutral, but in its enforcement 
there is an element of selectivity on the part of the executive, we must then ask if 
such selective enforcement is in fact discriminatory to the level of a violation of 
equal protection.142 Some selectivity is allowed in criminal prosecutions, but that 
selectivity cannot be based on impermissible categorizing along lines of race, 
religion, or presumably gender.143 
In order to best protect both male and female sex workers, these anti-
prostitution statutes must be enforced equally against both sexes. By only 
serving to prosecute women, men and women both suffer in terms of the 
imposed social discourse, and in the day-to-day violence that affects both parties. 
While the current constitutional schema may indeed protect people from 
discrimination today, the Court, and the other 30 states without ERAs, would do 
well to close the gap of “real” difference and ensure that heteronormative and 
patriarchal ideas of gender difference stop placing men and women into roles 
within which they may not fit. If not, we risk the propagation of further 
discrimination against women and against those men who may find themselves 
in need of the protections offered by banning sex work as a feasible career 
option. A close look at the reasoning behind the arguments for difference reveals 
that little, if any, difference exists at all. 
When analyzing male-male to female-male sex exchanges, the obvious 
question becomes, whether there is enough of a real difference between the 
harms sought to be avoided in each arrangement such that selectively enforcing 
anti-prostitution laws against women and not men is constitutionally 
permissible. The answer to this question of course hinges on if real differences 
exist, because if they do, then selective enforcement would presumably be 
constitutional. If there are no real differences, the purpose of selective 
enforcement is not substantially related to an important governmental interest, 
the selectivity would not be allowed. 
Presumably, it is the larger social harm of the woman engaging in 
 
 137.  See discussion supra Part IV. 
 138.  See Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (stating that one does 
not need to be a doctor to realize that men and women are different because women can get 
pregnant). 
 139.  See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (discussing the different treatment of men 
and women serving as naval officers). 
 140.  See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974 (“There can be no dispute that the financial 
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the 
man.”). 
 141.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 
(1948)). 
 142.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). 
 143.  See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (“Moreover, the conscious exercise of some 
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.”). 
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prostitution as her only viable means of financial support which somewhat 
justifies the total banning of female prostitution in most states. Instead of, for 
example, allowing high-end escort services to operate, we maintain the 
assumption that we are avoiding the potential harms to women that come with 
lower level, less lucrative, and more dangerous, street prostitution. If female 
prostitution at that low, street level causes social harms, then we can presumably 
justify that we as a society value a total ban on female prostitution in order to 
avoid line drawing problems (i.e. how high-end is high-end enough?), and to 
assert that there may be some harm that comes to society as a whole with the 
availability of any female prostitution (an argument put forward by many on 
moral and religious grounds). The same argument becomes harder to make 
when it is more difficult to identify equivalent and equal social harms in a same-
sex interaction. For example, where presumably one or both parties identify as 
homosexual, (particularly where the prostitute identifies as homosexual), the 
threat of heteronormative coercion and power differentials is absent. Admittedly, 
the moral and religious argument that any male prostitution is a harm still exists, 
but as the Court has said, moral disapproval is not enough to justify a statute.144 
But to admit such a difference is to in and of itself implicate a series of 
heteronormative structures, wherein we assume that female to male sex is 
inherently different from same-sex sexual conduct, and that the male figure is in 
a position of power over the woman that he somehow does not occupy vis-à-vis 
a male sex worker. This assumption helps to explain the Arab world’s treatment 
of homosexuality and homosexual prostitution as existing outside the definitions 
of the Western homo/hetero binary, as the active client/participant is able to 
maintain his masculinity and heteronormative dominance over a socially-
perceived feminine and submissive passive partner.145 If such traditionalist views 
of gender roles and power structures are taken into play, we must ask from the 
constitutional perspective whether these traditions are truths, or whether there is 
no real difference in the social harms that we seek to subvert. If there is no 
difference,  we either must admit that we think it wrong for anyone, of any 
gender in any sort of male-male, female-male, or female-female pairing, to 
engage in sexual activity with the promise of remuneration, or we must identify 
a real biological difference that somehow makes same-sex (in the context of this 
note, male-male sex) appreciably different from female-male prostitution 
scenarios to justify the differing treatment both from a historical legislative view, 
and from the current female-male biased enforcement and prosecution route. 
There are a number of potential differences, outside the traditional 
heteronormative and patriarchal framework, that might be put forward as for 
why male-male exchanges represent different problems from female-male 
interactions. The most obvious concern is the transmission of HIV. According to 
the Center for Disease Control, “in 2010 MSM [men who have sex with men] 
accounted for 78% of the new HIV infections among males,” and “the rate of new 
 
 144.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (rejecting the state’s argument that the law at 
hand protects the freedom of association for the people who object to homosexuality, implying that 
those objections do not serve a legitimate government interest). 
 145.  See Needham, supra note 14, at 292 (discussing the power dynamics in Arabic homosexual 
relations). 
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HIV infections among males . . . was 4.2 times that of females.”146 Some past 
research described male sex workers as “‘vectors of disease transmission into the 
heterosexual world.’”147 This fear stemmed from the idea that many men taking 
part in sex work self-identify as heterosexual and thus would bring home their 
work to female partners. But this fear of “infecting” the heterosexual world 
ignores the fact that most sex workers identify as gay or bisexual,148 as well as 
other studies which have shown that sex workers more often use condoms with 
clients than with non-clients.149 Additional research has suggested that “HIV 
rates in samples of male sex workers do not differ significantly from rates of HIV 
among samples of men who have sex with men in general.”150 Law enforcement 
might use the relative safety, then, of male-male sex work to justify that there is 
no need to protect public health by targeting these men. This assumes that HIV 
transmission is the only appreciable difference between male-male and female-
male exchanges, but this is not the only difference that would likely be put 
forward by law enforcement. 
A more legally viable difference may be the relative differences in strength 
between men and women and the way such differences play out violently in sex 
work. The Court suggested in VMI that if women were really physically unable 
to participate in the same training as their male counterparts, that physical 
strength differences could be considered.151 This line of thinking would allow 
that men are stronger than women on average, and so we need to ensure that 
women are not physically abused by their clients. As such, we can selectively 
enforce against female-male interactions. Similarly, as women are able to get 
pregnant and bear children, another difference acknowledged by the Court,152 
the government could have an interest in ensuring that children are not born out 
of wedlock, or even that pregnancies occur outside of the marriage union.153 
 
 146.  Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Incidence, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/surveillance/incidence/index.html (last updated May 
22, 2013). 
 147.  MICHAEL D. SMITH & CHRISTIAN GROV, IN THE COMPANY OF MEN 26 (2011) (quoting Edward 
V. Morse et al., The Male Street Prostitute: A Vector for Transmission of HIV Infection into the Heterosexual 
World, 32 SOC. SCI. MED. 535, 535 (1991). 
 148.  See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 10. 
 149.  See SMITH & GROV, supra note 146, at 26 (citing David S. Bimbi, Male Prostitution: Pathology, 
Paradigms, and Progress in Research, 53 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 7, 7-35 (2007); David S. Bimbi & Jeffrey T. 
Parsons, Barebacking Among Internet Based Male Sex Workers, 9 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 85, 
85-105 (2005); Matthew J. Mimiaga et al., Street Workers and Internet Escorts, 86 J. URB. HEALTH 54, 54-
66 (2009); M. Parker, Core Groups and the Transmission of HIV: Learning from Male Sex Workers, 00 J. 
BIOSOCIAL SCI. 1, 1-15 (2005); M.D. Smith & D.W. Seal, Sexual Behavior, Mental Health, Substance Use, 
and HIV Risk Among Agency-Based Male Escorts in a Small U.S. City, 19 INT’L J. SEXUAL HEALTH 27, 27-39 
(2007)). 
 150.  SMITH & GROV, supra note 147, at 26 (citing I. Vanwesenbeeck, Another Decade of Social 
Scientific Work on Sex Work: A Review of the Research 1990-2000, 12 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 242, 242-300 
(2001)). 
 151.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (explaining that the program was not 
found to be so strenuous that a woman could not complete it). 
 152.  Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981). 
 153.  An argument itself advanced by proponents of Proposition 8 in California, where it was 
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Numerous studies have shown that male sex workers do themselves experience 
violence,154 although one might ask whether the violence is of the same level or 
concern as that found in female-male interactions. Men certainly cannot get 
pregnant, so that concern has no equivalent in the male-male situation. These 
concerns, then, might both be considered valid from a constitutional, legal 
perspective, and could perhaps withstand intermediate scrutiny if a defendant 
could first demonstrate that selective enforcement itself exists. The fact that this 
discriminatory enforcement might be found constitutional highlights some major 
problems with the ways in which we consider gender differences themselves as a 
matter of constitutional law. Both of these examples implicate the concern, 
discussed above, that in treating male-male sex as something inherently different 
from female-male sex, devoid of the elements of coercion and force that are read 
into heterosexual exchanges, both men and women suffer. Men, because they are 
denied the protection, admittedly of a patriarchal state, that comes with 
admitting the same dangers inherent to all prostitution, and women in that we 
frame the prostitution discourse as one of a female victim and male abuser, 
denying women the sexual freedom to pursue prostitution with dignity and 
respect. 
Massachusetts, as highlighted above, is one of twenty states which have 
decided for themselves that intermediate scrutiny will not suffice when facing 
statutes which discriminate, either facially or through selective enforcement, on 
the basis of sex, through enactment of Equal Rights Amendments that cover sex 
in their state constitutions.155 These states have decided that the differences 
accepted by the Supreme Court are not valid reasons for discriminatory 
treatment under the law. In this way they may be seen as echoing the reasoning 
of MacKinnon,156 that in acknowledging these sorts of differences we are in effect 
continuing to accept discrimination, perhaps creating more of a difference than 
actually exists. 
The discourse of difference itself can be used to rob women of the equality 
they deserve, and conversely, place male sex workers in a disadvantaged 
position. In the context of sex work, if we accept the proposition that women are 
more at risk of violence in female-male exchanges than men in male-male 
exchanges,157 we as a society are robbing women of their own strength to resist 
violence or to assert themselves by stating that they are in fact less capable of 
protecting themselves. Through this sort of discourse we weaken what strength 
 
argued that expanding the definition of marriage would affect heterosexual couples’ incentives to 
marry and have children within the married relationship. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26-34, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144). 
 154.  See generally DORIAS, supra note 11; SMITH & GROV, supra note 147; WEST, supra note 6. 
 155.  See LESLIE W. GLADSTONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20217, EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS: 
STATE PROVISIONS 1 (1999), available at http://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney.house.gov 
/files/documents/olddocs/era/CRS.pdf. 
 156.  See STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 652 (quoting CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW  3, 8-9 (1987)). (JW, Rule 1, 4.2, 15). 
 157.  While studies have shown that male sex workers experience violence, it is unclear whether 
they experience it at the same level as female sex workers. See WEST, supra note 6, at 99 (describing the 
risk of violence that goes along with male prostitution); See also DORAIS, supra note 11, at 67 
(describing male sex workers’ violent incidents). 
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they may indeed have and send a signal to men and women alike that women 
are vulnerable to attacks. A similar set of reasoning follows from the pregnancy 
argument: by stating that the government has an interest in ensuring that 
pregnancies occur within wedlock, we deny women the power to be self-selected 
single parents, and somewhat rob them of autonomy over their own procreative 
choices, insinuating that while women can end a pregnancy in marriage,158 they 
must be married to a man in order to exercise the choice of actually having a 
baby. 
Men, too, suffer when we accept these differences. As discussed above, men 
too experience violence at the hands of their clients, and in failing to enforce anti-
prostitution laws against men, those male sex workers are less likely to be 
protected from abusive clients. By essentially stating that these men should be 
able to protect themselves, we shame male sex workers into not reporting the 
crimes committed against them, for to do so would be to admit emasculation at 
the hands of another man. In short, by acknowledging “real” differences, all we 
do is reinforce heteronormative stereotypes about the roles that men and women 
should play in society, both on the streets and in the bedroom, and in the 
process, we hurt everyone. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, while the Supreme Court could ultimately find that the 
differences between men and women are such that selective enforcement of anti-
prostitution laws against women and not men is constitutional, such a decision 
would bring to light a number of issues regarding the way that the Court, and 
we as a society, have framed the difference between men and women. While 
there are indeed physical differences between the sexes, sweeping 
generalizations about these differences, from deeming women physically 
weaker, to calling men more aggressive, only serves to further entrench gender 
stereotypes that many may find an ill fit. As far as prostitution goes, selective 
enforcement against women sends a message to women that they are in need of 
more help, that they are weaker than their male counterparts. The same selective 
enforcement simultaneously infers that male-male exchanges are not a social 
problem, that men can take care of themselves, and that we as a society would 
rather turn a blind eye than ensure that these men are given the same 
protections, via enforcement, that women have. Law enforcement agencies 
would do well to alter their enforcement policies so as to end this mixed message 
of discrimination and gender stereotyping. At the same time, the courts should 
reexamine the way in which “real” difference has been framed, closing any gaps 
that may allow for discrimination on the simple basis of traditional gender, and 
heteronormative, stereotyping. 
 
 
 158.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining how a woman’s autonomy to decide 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy is encompassed in a general right of privacy). 
